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Determinative Statutes
Section 31A-22-305(8) through 31A-22-305(10).

* "i

Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
Billie Peterson was injured in a truck rollover on September
6,

1993.

The rollover was the fault of a co-employee.

Mr.

Peterson claimed underinsured motorist insurance benefits from the
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company.

The benefits were denied due

to the language in the Utah Worker's Compensation Act.
Course of the Proceedings
Mr. Peterson filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment
that he was entitled to receive underinsured motorist benefits from
his insurance carrier.

His complaint was dismissed.
Statement of Facts

1.

On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by R&O

Construction Company of Ogden, Utah.
2.

Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job site

in Nevada.
3.

The co-employee was driving his private truck to the job

site in Nevada.
4.

Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck.

Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were being

paid some wage compensation for their travel time.
5.

While driving west on 1-80

in Tooele County, the co-

employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel.
roadway and rolled.

The truck left the

The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was

severely injured.
6.

At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was insured by

Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from which he had purchased
- 2 -

underinsured coverage in the amount of $25,000.
7.

Following his injury, Mr. Peterson made a claim upon the

insurance company for payment of those underinsured benefits.
8.

The insurance company denied payment of the underinsured

benefits saying Mr. Peterson's claim is barred by the exclusive
remedy portion of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Section 35-160, Utah Code Annotated.
9.

Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to receive

the underinsured motorist benefits under Sections

31A-2-305(8)

through (10) and under the case of Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Ut.
Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1995).
10.

Following briefing and argument, the trial court granted

the insurance company's Motion for Summary Judgment dismissing Mr.
Peterson's claim.
Summary of the Argument
Under the holding in Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Ut. Adv. Rep.
20 (Utah 1995) and the statutory language of Section 31A-22-305 (8)
through (10),

Mr. Peterson was entitled to receive underinsured

motorist coverage benefits as a result of the injuries he sustained
on September 6, 1995.
Argument
Plaintiff had purchased underinsured motorist coverage through
Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company.

Under Utah law underinsured

coverage is available whenever there is "insufficient liability
coverage to compensate fully the injured party for all special and
general damages."

U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305 (8) .
- 3 -

And, it is the

clear intent of the statute that this type of coverage be "added
to, combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of the
owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle•" Section 31A22-305(9) (b) . Quite clearly it was the legislature's intent that
these monies actually be paid.
While the defendant is correct that some other states have
denied recovery in similar circumstances, this outcome is not
universal under general law principles and the cited cases are not
controlling in this instance, because the specific language of the
Utah underinsured statute and case law interpreting that statute
are different, requiring a different result.
In the Utah case of Neel v. State of Utah, 257 Utah. Adv. Rep.
2 0 (Utah 1995), the court held that the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Statute did not bar an injured
worker's recovery of personal injury protection benefits under a
motor vehicle insurance policy.

The decision was based on the

particular wording of the Utah No-Fault Act.

The court stated

that:
Had the legislature intended PIP insurers to
have an absolute defense against injured
employees, lawmakers could have easily added
language to the Statute indicating this
intent.
Interestingly, in wording the
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage
statute, the legislature did that very thing
by adding this language: *This coverage does
not apply to an employee, who is injured by an
uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is
provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, Worker's
Compensation.'
No similar language is
included in the PIP statute . . .
Id. at 22.

The Neel decision is, however, on a close reading, favorable
to and determinative of plaintiffs

claim

in this case.

The

statutory language cited by the court evidencing the legislative
intent that the exclusive remedy provision apply to uninsured
motorist

benefits

solely

underinsured benefits.

applied

to

uninsured

benefits,

not

The plain language of that portion of the

statute clearly reflects this, as noted above by the emphasized
notation uninsured in a quote above.
(10)

of

the

statute, which

In subsections (8) through

particularly

benefits, no similar provision is found.

address

underinsured

Therefore, under the

court's reasoning in Neel, the absence of language providing for
the exclusive remedy defense is determinative of a legislative
intent that the defense does not apply in underinsured situations.
There is no language in the underinsured portion of the statute
suggesting the exclusive remedy provision bars recovery.

Further,

the only reference to the exclusive remedy provision explicitly
states it applies to uninsured coverage, not underinsured coverage.
The language in Neel suggesting that the exclusive remedy
provision applies to underinsured as well as uninsured benefits is
simply careless writing on the part of the court. The language the
court refers to clearly applies on its face to uninsured coverage.
The provisions dealing with underinsured coverage do not contain an
explicit reference to the applicability of the exclusive remedy
provision.

The absence of such an explicit reference in the PIP

statute was the basis of the court's holding that exclusive remedy
provision did not apply to PIP benefits.
- 5 -

Similarly, the exclusive

remedy provision cannot apply to underinsured motorist benefits
under U.C.A., Section 31A-22-305, because the necessary language is
absent.
Concerning

the

issue

of

plaintiff/s

claim

against

Mr.

Clifford, the courts in Oklahoma have specifically addressed this
question. See Barfield v. Barfield, 742 P.2d 1107 (Okl. 1987) and
Torres v. Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins., 849 P.2d 407 (Okl. 1993).
In Torres, the Oklahoma Supreme Court recently reaffirmed

its

earlier holding that an injured worker who is also insured under an
underinsured motor vehicle insurance policy is entitled to recover
underinsured benefits "even though the negligent tortfeasor was a
co-employee immune under the worker's compensation law." The court
explained that "the phrase legally entitled to recover damages
simply means the insured must be able to establish fault on the
part of the uninsured motorist which gives rise to damages and
prove the extent of those damages."

Id. at 410. Further the court

noted that the "overriding determination in our view is whether the
party attempting to recover under the UM endorsement is an insured
under the policy

. . ."

Id. at 411.

Finally, the court also

stated that:
the intention was the UM coverage would be
available once it was determined that the
party seeking coverage was an insured under
the policy,
that the uninsured tortfeasor
causing damage was at fault and the extent of
those damages was shown.
Id. at 412.
The holding of the Oklahoma court is consistent with the
- 6 -

public

policy

determination

injured motorists

of the Utah

legislature

that

all

in this state should have available to them

underinsured coverage regardless of the employment relationship
existing between the injured person as the at-fault driver.
Conclusion
Given the particular language of Section 31A-22-305(8) through
(10), Mr. Peterson was entitled to receive, from Utah Farm Bureau,
underinsured motorist benefits.
DATED this ^(J

day o f ^ ^ ^ ^ L ^ ^ 199^.
MARQUARDT, H^SENYAGER & CUSTEN

fi&*^,
ES R. H^CS EN YAGER
ttorney for Appella
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foregoing Brief of Appellant, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan
Mitchell T. Rice
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

BILLIE PETERSON,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

vs.

:

UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,

:

Defendant/Appellee.
1.

DOCKETING STATEMENT
(subject to assignment to the
Utah Court of Appeals)

Case No.

Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From:

October

10, 1995.
2.
3.

Nature of Post-Judgment Motions and Date Filed:

None.

Date and Effect of Orders Disposing of Post-Judgment

Motion: Not applicable.
4.

Date of Filing of Notice of Appeal:

5.

Jurisdiction:

October 13, 1995.

The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this

matter pursuant to Section 78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated.
6.
Judicial

Name of Trial Court:
District

This is an appeal from the Third

Court of Tooele

County,

the Honorable

John

Rokich, District Court Judge.
7.

Statement of Facts:
A. On September 6, 1993, Billie Peterson was employed by

R&O Construction Company of Ogden, Utah.

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
Page 2
B. Mr. Peterson and a co-employee were assigned to a job
site in Nevada.
C.

The co-employee was driving his private truck to the

job site in Nevada.
D.

Mr. Peterson was a passenger in the truck.

Both Mr. Peterson and the co-employee driver were

being paid some wage compensation for their travel time.
E.

While driving west on 1-80 in Tooele County, the co-

employee apparently fell asleep at the wheel.
roadway and rolled.

The truck left the

The driver was killed and Mr. Peterson was

severely injured.
F.

At the time of his injury, Mr. Peterson was insured

by Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from which he had purchased
underinsured coverage in the amount of $25,000.
G.

Following his injury, Mr. Peterson made a claim upon

the insurance company for payment of those underinsured benefits.
H.

The

insurance

company

denied

payment

of

the

underinsured benefits saying Mr. Peterson's claim is barred by the
exclusive remedy portion of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act,
Section 35-1-60, Utah Code Annotated.
I.

Mr. Peterson has contended that he is entitled to

receive the underinsured motorist benefits under Sections 31A-23 05(8) through (10) and under the case of Neel v. State of Utah,
257 Ut. Adv. Rep. 20 (Utah 1995).
J.
granted

the

Following briefing and argument, the trial court
insurance

company's

motion

for

summary

judgment

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
Page 3
dismissing Mr. Peterson's claim.
8.

Issues for Review and Standard of Review:
A.

Whether

Mr.

Peterson

is

entitled,

in

these

circumstances, to receive underinsured motorist benefits from Utah
Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
B.

The Standard for Review is in the interpretation of

a statute, a question of law, reviewed for correctness.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993);

State v.

Schurtz v. BMW of North

America. Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991).
9.

Determinative Statutes and Case Law:

Sections 31A-22-305

(8) through (10); Neel v. State of Utah. 257 Utah Adv. Rep. 20
(Utah 1995).
10.

There have been no prior appeals in this case.
DATED this ^

day otA/^K£^c/!^

, 1995.

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

/fAMES R. HASENYAG
Attorney for Plai

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this

/>-

day of November,

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Docketing Statement, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan
Mitchell T. Rice
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

SECRETARYfl

ADDENDUM B

RECtlVtU our

IN THE

I

THIRD DISTRICT COURT

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
PETERSON, BILLIE
PLAINTIFF
VS
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE CO
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 950300029 PI
DATE 09/19/95
HONORABLE JOHN A. ROKICH
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK RGB

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY. HASENYAGER, JAMES R
D. ATTY. STEPHEN G. MORGAN

NOTICE OF DECISION:
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS GRANTED FOR
THE REASONS SET FORTH IN DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM.
DEFENDANT WILL PREPARE AN ORDER CONSISTENT WITH THE
RULING OF THE COURT.
C/C COUNSEL

W W

ADDENDUM C

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
24 08 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 844 01
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 1404

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOLE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

NOTICE OF APPEAL

BILLIE PETERSON,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Civil No. 950300029

vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendant/Appellee.

Judge:

John Rokich

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie
Peterson,

through

counsel

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER

James

R.

Hasenyager

of

the

firm

& CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Court of

Appeals the Order Granting Defendant Utah Farm Bureau Insurance
Company's Motion for Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable John
Rokich on October 10, 1995.

/f

DATED this /J^day of/ / / f f l ^ 1995.
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER. & CUSTEN

7

fcf£^
-M&
R. HASENYAGER

sti

ttorney for Plaintiff

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this

)

day of October,

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Notice of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan
Mitchell T. Rice
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

[lh\ 1/IAlf
SECRETARY^j*

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN LC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
2408 Van Buren Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: (801) 621-3662
Utah State Bar No. 1404

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BILLIE PETERSON,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

Plaintiff/Appellant,
Civil No. 950300029

vs.
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Judge:

Defendant/Appellee.

John Rokich

Notice is hereby given that plaintiff/appellant, Billie
Peterson,

through

counsel

James

R.

Hasenyager

of

the

firm

MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court
the Order Granting Defendant Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company's
Motion for Summary Judgment signed by the Honorable John Rokich on
October 10, 1995.
DATED this ^

day of / ^ ? W W ^ 7 , 1995.
MARQUARDT, HASENYAGER & CUSTEN

/

TAMES R. HASENYAGER
/Attorney for Plaintiff

Peterson v. Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Co.
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
**********************

I hereby certify that on this

^

' day of November,

1995, I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Notice of Appeal, postage prepaid, to the following:
Stephen G. Morgan
Mitchell T. Rice
MORGAN & HANSEN
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor
13 6 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BOND NO. 29-1104353

BILLIE PETERSON.
(Plaintiff/Appellant)

UNDERTAKING
FOR COST ON APPEAL
Civil No. 950300029 PI
vs.
Judge: John Rokich
UTAH FARM BUREAU INSURANCE
COMPANY.
(Defendant/Appellee)

WHEREAS, the above-named plaintiff/appellant desires to give an undertaking for COST ON APPEAL as provided
by Section 63-30-19 of the Utah Code Annotated.
NOW, THEREFORE, Old Republic Surety Company, a corporation duly licensed to do business in the State of Utah, as
Surety, does hereby obligate itself, its successors and assigns to the above named defendant/appellee under said statutory obligations
in the sum of THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS and NO/100 ($300.00**)
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah the 12th day of October , 1995.
OLD REPUBLIC SURETY COMPANY
/J*

\

N* \

^/*V

/fe^^J

BY:
Its: Kathleen Fowler, Attorney-in-Fact
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AFFIDAVIT OF QUALIFICATION

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

Kathleen Fowler appeared personally before me and declared that she is the Attorney-in-Fact of the Old Republic Surety
Company, and that she is duly authorized to execute and deliver the foregoing obligation; that said Company is
authorized to execute the same and has complied in all respects with that laws of Utah, ia reference to becoming sole
surety upon bonds, undertakings and obligations.

Kathleen Fowler, Attorney-in-Fact

Subscribed and Sworn to before me this 10th Day of October, 1995.
M/JAliY I»UULIC

CARLY COLE
1335 East 10600 South
Sandy. Utah 84092
My Commission Expires
November 12. 1997
P-AT*, O K UTAH

My commission expires

"AV/7

\~/

tary Public
Lake City, Utah

ADDENDUM D

IINOUXvr*r*

jlf-insurance, uninsured motorist coverage of at least
25,000 per person and $500,000 per accident.
(i) This coverage is secondary to any other insurance covering an injured covered person.
(ii) This coverage does not apply to an employee,
who is injured by an uninsured motorist, whose
exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1,
Workers' Compensation,
(c) As used in this subsection:
(i) "Governmental entity" has the same meaning
as under Section 63-30-2.
(ii) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as under
Section 41-la-102.
When a covered person alleges that an uninsured motor
le under Subsection (2Xb) proximately caused an acciwithout touching the covered person or the vehicle
led by the covered person, the covered person must show
xistence of the uninsured motor vehicle by clear and
ncing evidence consisting of more than the covered
n's testimony.
(a) The limit of liability for uninsured motorist coverage
or two or more motor vehicles may not be added together,
ombined, or stacked to determine the limit of insurance
overage available to an injured person for any one
iccident.
(b) (i) Subsection (a) applies to all persons except a
covered person as denned under Subsection (7XbXii).
(ii) A covered person as defined under Subsection
(7XbXii) is entitled to the highest limits of uninsured
motorist coverage afforded for any one vehicle that
the covered person is the named insured or an insured family member.
(iii) This coverage shall be in addition to the coverage on the vehicle the covered person is occupying.
(iv) Neither the primary nor the secondary coverage may be set off against the other.
(c) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the time of
an accident shall be primary coverage, and the coverage
elected by a person described under Subsections (lXa) and
(b) shall be secondary coverage.
) (a) Uninsured motorist coverage under this section applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of covered
persons while occupying or using a motor vehicle only if
the motor vehicle is described in the policy under which a
claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a newly acquired
or replacement vehicle covered under the terms of the
policy. Except as provided in Subsection (6) or (7), a
covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy
that includes uninsured motorist benefits may not elect to
collect uninsured motorist coverage benefits from any
other motor vehicle insurance policy under which he is a
covered person.
(b) Each of the following persons may also recover
uninsured motorist benefits under any other policy in
which they are described as a "covered person" as defined
in Subsection (1):
(i) a covered person injured as a pedestrian by an
uninsured motor vehicle; and
(ii) a covered person injured while occupying or
using a motor vehicle that is not owned by, furnished,
or available for the regular use of the covered person,
the covered person's resident spouse, or the covered
person's resident relative.
(c) A covered person in Subsection (7Xb) is not barred
against making subsequent elections if recovery is unavailable under previous elections.
8) (a) As used in this section, "underinsured motor vehicle" includes a vehicle, the operation, maintenance, or
use of which is covered under a liability policy at the time

of an injury-causing occurrence, but which has insufficient liability coverage to compensate fully the injured
party for all special and general damages.
(b) The term "underinsured motor vehicle" does not
include:
(i) a motor vehicle that is covered under the liability coverage of the same policy that also contains the
underinsured motorist coverage; or
(ii) an uninsured motor vehicle as defined in Subsection (2).
(9) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under Subsection
31A-22-302(lXc) provides coverage for covered persons
who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners
or operators of underinsured motor vehicles because of
bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death in limits of at
least $10,000 for one person in any one accident, and at
least $20,000 for two or more persons in any one accident.
(b) The named insured's underinsured motorist coverage, as described in Subsection (9Xa), is secondary to the
liability coverage of an owner or operator of an
underinsured motor vehicle, as described in Subsection
(8). Underinsured motorist coverage may not be set off
against the liability coverage of the owner or operator of
an underinsured motor vehicle, but shall be added to,
combined with, or stacked upon the liability coverage of
the owner or operator of the underinsured motor vehicle
to determine the limit of coverage available to the injured
person.
(c) (i) For new policies or contracts written after January 1, 1993, a named insured may reject
underinsured motorist coverage by an express writing to the insurer that provides liability coverage
under Subsection 31A-22-302 (lXa). This rejection
continues for that issuer of the liability coverage until
the insured in writing requests underinsured motorist coverage from that liability insurer.
(ii) In conjunction with the first three renewal
notices sent after January 1, 1993, for policies existing on that date, the insurer shall notify the insured
of the availability of underinsured motorist coverage
along with estimated ranges of premiums for the
coverage. The department shall provide standard
language to be used by insurers to fulfill the insurers'
duty under this subsection.
(10) (a) Underinsured motorist coverage under this section
applies to bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death of an
insured while occupying or using a motor vehicle owned
by, furnished, or available for the regular use of the
insured, a resident spouse, or resident relative of the
insured, only if the motor vehicle is described in the policy
under which a claim is made, or if the motor vehicle is a
newly acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the
terms of the policy. Except as provided in Subsection (10),
a covered person injured in a vehicle described in a policy
that includes underinsured motorist benefits may not
elect to collect underinsured motorist coverage benefits
from any other motor vehicle insurance policy under
which he is a named insured.
(b) (i) The limit of liability for underinsured motorist
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be
added together, combined, or stacked to determine
the limit of insurance coverage available to an injured
person for any one accident.
(ii) Subsection (bXi) applies to all persons except a
covered person as defined under Subsection (cXiXB).
(iii) Coverage on a motor vehicle occupied at the
time of an accident shall be primary coverage, and
the coverage elected by a person described under
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Sue NEEL, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee.
No. 940282.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Feb. 2, 1995.

State employee who was injured in car
accident while riding in state-owned car in
course of her employment brought action to
recover personal injury protection (PIP) benefits against the state, as self-insurer. The
Second District Court, Weber County, dismissed action, and employee appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Bench, J., 854 P.2d 581,
reversed and remanded. The Second District Court, Stanton M. Taylor, J., entered
summary judgment for state, and employee
appealed. The Supreme Court, Howe, J.,
held that workers' compensation exclusivity
provision did not bar action, oveiruling IML
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen.
Reversed and remanded.

1. Appeal and Error <S=*842(2)
Because parties raised only questions of
law, Supreme Court would give trial court's
legal conclusions no deference and would review them for correctness.
2. Insurance <£=>467.61(4)
Whether employee is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits cannot
turn on employer's decision to secure private
insurance or to self-insure. U.C.A.1953, 4 1 12a-407(2).
3. Insurance ®=>532.5(3)
Where automobile accident is covered by
both workers' compensation and no-fault insurance, statute providing that personal injury protection (PIP) benefits are payable to
injured employee but are reduced by benefits
which he receives under workers' compensation permits no-fault insurer to exclude some
liability, that which is compensable under
workers' compensation, but not all liability;

overruling IML Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538
P.2d 296. U.C.A.1953, 31A-22-309(3)(a).
4. Statutes <^174
Supreme Court has no power to rewrite
statute to make it conform to an intention not
expressed.
5. Workers' Compensation <£=>2084
Workers' compensation exclusivity provision did not bar action for personal injury
protection (PIP) benefits under Automobile
No-Fault Insurance Act brought against
State, as self-insurer, by state employee who
was injured in car accident while riding in
state-owned car in course of her employment.
6. Insurance <3=*532.5(3)
No-fault insurers, including self-insurers, are required to pay personal injury protection (PIP) benefits to injured employees
to extent that those benefits exceed workers'
compensation benefits.
7. Insurance <3=>138(4)
Although state's self-insurance program
excludes personal injury protection (PIP)
benefits to any person entitled to workers'
compensation benefits, this exclusion is not in
harmony with statutory requirements and is,
therefore, invalid.
U.C.A.1953, 31A-22309(3)(a).

Daniel L. Wilson, Ogden, for plaintiff.
Jan Graham, Atty. Gen., Brent A. Burnett,
Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.
HOWE, Justice:
Plaintiff Sue Neel brought this action
against her employer, the State of Utah, to
collect personal injury protection ("PIP")
benefits under Utah's Automobile No-Fault
Insurance Act. The State initially moved to
dismiss the complaint for failure to comply
with the requirements of the Governmental
Immunity Act. The trial court granted the
motion without prejudice. On appeal, the
Utah Court of Appeals held that because the
action sounded in contract, the procedural
requirements of the immunity act did not
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apply. Neel v. State, 854 P.2d 581, 585 (Utah
CtApp.1993).
On remand, the State filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that Neel
was barred from seeking PIP benefits from
the State by the exclusive remedy provision
of the Workers' Compensation Act. The district court granted the motion on that basis,
and Neel appeals.
I.

FACTS

Neel was injured in a car accident in December 1990 while riding in a state-owned
car in the course of her employment with the
State. The State paid her all the workers'
compensation benefits to which she was entitled. In this action, she seeks PIP benefits
to the extent those benefits were not covered
by workers' compensation, including reimbursement for loss of household services, second-job wage loss, and the difference between wage reimbursement under workers'
compensation (seventy percent of lost wages)
and under PIP (eighty-five percent of lost
wages). See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-307.
She contends that she is entitled to these
benefits under section 31A-22-309(3) of the
code, which provides, "The benefits payable
to any injured person under [the PIP statute] are reduced by: (a) any benefits which
that person receives or is entitled to receive
as a result of an accident covered in this code
under . . . workers' compensation
"
At the time of the accident and all other
dates relevant to this action, the State selfinsured its motor vehicles as permitted by
statute. See § 41-12a-301(4). The State's
self-insurance program expressly excluded
from coverage "bodily injury to any person
who is entitled to payments or benefits under
the provisions of Utah's Workers' Compensation Law."
II.

ANALYSIS

[1] The facts are not in dispute. Because
the parties raise only questions of law, this
court gives the trial court's legal conclusions
no deference and reviews them for correctness. West Valley City Corp. v. Salt Lake
County, 852 P.2d 1000, 1002 (Utah 1993).

This case confronts an apparent conflict
between Utah's no-fault and workers' compensation statutes. The No-Fault Act requires that "[ejvery policy of insurance or
combination of policies, purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 . . . shall also
include personal injury
protection...."
§ 31A-22-302(2) (emphasis added). Section
41-12a-301(3)(a) declares that "the state . . .
shall maintain owner's or operator's security
in effect continuously for their motor vehicles." Thus the State, along with all other
employers, is required to have PIP coverage
on its motor vehicles.
Meanwhile, the Workers' Compensation
Act provides:
The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an employee . . . shall be
the exclusive remedy against the employer
. . . and the liabilities of the employer imposed by this act shall be in place of any
and all other civil liability whatsoever, at
common law or otherwise, to the employee....
§ 35-1-60 (emphasis added). Hence, while
one statute requires every auto insurance
policy—including those held by employers—
to include PIP coverage, the other statute
arguably bars injured employees from recovering any benefits from that coverage.
A.

IML

Freight

This is not an issue of first impression for
this court. Nearly two decades ago, we decided a declaratory judgment action based on
this same conflict. IML Freight, Inc. v.
Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 1975). Neel
argues that IML Freight merely addressed
the instant issue in dicta. However, a review
of the briefs filed by the parties in that case
and a careful reading of the opinion itself
have led us to conclude otherwise.
IML Freight arose when employees of an
interstate trucking company filed cfaims
against the company, requesting no-fault
benefits. The company filed an action to
cietermine its responsibilities to comply with
the no-fault statute and, more specifically,
Whether the workers' compensation exclusivity clause barred injured employees from ob-
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taming benefits from their employers' nofault coverage
The court framed the issue in terms of
whether the exclusivity provision "was repealed by the No-Fault concept " Id at 297
The court discussed the histoi ical importance
of the exclusive i emedy of workei s' compensation and reasoned that discrimination
would lesult if an employee injured in a
motor vehicle could recover more benefits
than an employee mjui ed in another manner
Id With little other discussion, the court
held as follows
We believe and hold that the language
used by the legislature [in the no-fault
statute] did not impose upon an employer
subject to the Workmen's Compensation
Act, the heart-beat of which is exclusiveness of remedy, any additional burden personally to pay any injured employee extra,
who happened to drive a motor vehicle, as
against fellow employees who happened to
push dock dollies or ride cranes to their
injury or death
Id (emphasis added)
[2] We find a number of problems with
this reasoning and holding First, the word
"personally" in the holding implies that although an employer need not personally pay
PIP benefits, perhaps the employer's private
no-fault insurer would have to do so See 2A
Aithur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Com
pensation k 7124(e), at 14-69 n 4 (1994)
(citing IML Freight and speculating that its
holding may apply onl> to self-insurer)
Whethei an employee is entitled to PIP benefits cannot turn on the employers decision
to secure pnvate insurance oi to self-insure
See § 41-12a-407(2) (self-insurers "shall pay
benefits to persons injured from the selffunded person's operation, maintenance, and
use of motoi vehicles as would an insurer
issuing a policy to the self-funded person"),
Neel v State, 854 P 2d 581, 584 (Utah Ct
Appl993) ("The State's election to self-insuie cannot become a stumbling block to the
swift recovery of PIP benefits ") Although
parts of IML Freight can be read to clarify
the coui t's use of the word "personally," the
holding remains confusing
The court's discnmination-of-workers theory is also troubling It ignores the legisla-

ture's requirement that no-fault coverage apply to "[ejvery policy of [auto) insurance"
§ 31A-22-302(2)
Thus, contiary to IML
Freight, the no-fault statute effectively imposed upon all owners of motoi vehicles—
including employers—an additional burden to
buy PIP coveiage for then vehicles
The legislature chose to legulate this aspect of insurance for all owners of motor
vehicles, including employers who own the
motor vehicles used in their businesses
This can hardly be deemed discrimination.
"[0]ur legislature has the power and duty to
promote the public health, safety, and general welfare of all citizens In furtherance of
that power and duty, conditions and regulations for the operation of motor vehicles on
our public roads and highways are a proper
subject for legislative action " State v Ste
vens, 718 P2d 398, 399 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam) (footnote omitted) Indeed, the only
discrimination that is involved here arises
from IML Freight One who is injured in a
motor vehicle accident and is coveied by
workers' compensation is entitled to less benefits than another who is also injured in such
an accident but is not covered by workers'
compensation
B

Utah Code Ann

§

3lA-22-309(3)

The most troubling aspect of IML Freight
is its cursory tieatment of the statute that
directly confronts this issue The no-fault
statute explicitly pi ovides, "The benefits payable to any injuied person under [the PIP
statute] are reduced by (a) any benefits
which that person receives or is entitled to
receive as a result of an accident coveied in
this code under any workei s' compensation
or similar statutory plan
" § 31A-22309(3) At the time IML Freight was decided, the substantially identical statute was
numbered at section 31-41-7(3) (Supp 1973)
IML Fieight mentions the statute only in
passing
If there be an argument that the NoFault Act supeisedes the Woikmen s Compensation Act because it allows foi deduction of Workmen's Compensation payments from a No-Fault insurance judgment or settlement, constitutionally it
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would appear to be flattened, since the
added compensation thus afforded obviously would discriminate in favor of one type
of employee, at the expense of an employer, and to the exclusion of others.
IML Freight, 538 P.2d at 297. We disagree
with this analysis.
"The court's principal duty in interpreting
statutes is to determine legislative intent,
and the best evidence of legislative intent is
the plain language of the statute." Sullivan
v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877,
879 (Utah 1993) (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906
(Utah 1984)). "[W]e presume that the Legislature used each term advisedly, and we give
effect to each term according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning." Versluis v. Guaranty Nat'l Cos., 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992).
[3] The plain language of section 31A22-309(3)(a) indicates that the legislature
considered the very issue that is at hand in
this case and decided that PIP benefits are
payable to an injured employee but that
these benefits are reduced by "any benefits
which that person receives . . . under . . .
workers' compensation." In other words, an
injured party should be able to receive PIP
benefits to the extent that those benefits are
not already paid by workers' compensation.
The court of appeals has already so interpreted the statute:
We interpret [section 31A-22-309(3)(a) ] as
expressing the legislature's determination
that, as between a no-fault insurer and a
workers' compensation insurer . . . , the nofault insurer should not bear the burden of
paying the benefits due to an employee
accidently injured in the course of employment even if that injury occurred in a
vehicle covered by the requisite no-fault
insurance. Accordingly, the no-fault insurer is permitted by this statute to exclude from coverage provided under its
insurance policy any liability for injuries
that are compensable under the workers'
compensation statute
Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573,
577 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (emphasis added).
Thus where an accident is covered by both
workers' compensation and no-fault insurance, the statute permits a no-fault insurer to

exclude some liability—that which is compensable under workers' compensation—but not
all liability.
In oral argument, the State contended that
the PIP statute was intended to benefit only
employees driving their own vehicles, not
employees driving their employers' vehicles.
This strained interpretation would have us
read language into an otherwise unambiguous statute. The State cites no authority for
this assertion, and our own research has not
uncovered any case supporting this theory.
Although there is some split of authority
on whether the exclusive remedy clause bars
an action by employees against their employers' no-fault insurance, the division is primarily due to the differing language of the various no-fault statutes. See 2A Arthur Larson,
The Law of Workmen's
Compensation
§ 71.24(e), at 14-68 (1994); Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of
No-Fault Insurance Plans Providing for
Reduction of Benefits Otherwise Payable by
Amounts Receivable From Independent Collateral Sources, 10 A.L.R.4th 996, 1010-13
(1981).
No split of authority appears, however, in
states whose no-fault statutes specifically
provide that PIP benefits will be reduced by
workers' compensation benefits as does section 31A-22-309(3)(a). These states have
uniformly allowed both types of benefits.
See, e.g., Tate v. Industrial Claim Appeals
Office, 815 P.2d 15, 19 (Colo.1991) ("This
provision coordinates the workers' compensation and PIP benefits so that the injured
person does not receive duplicate benefits.");
Brown v. Boston Old Colony Ins. Co., 247
Ga. 287, 275 S.E.2d 651, 652 (1981) (declining
to go against clear statutory language to
deny PIP benefits to injured employee); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co of Michigan,
175 Mich.App. 157, 437 N.W.2d 338, 339
(1989) (statute's purpose "is to reduce the
basic cost of insurance by requiring a set-off
of those government benefits [including
workers' compensation] that duplicate nofault benefits and coordinating those benefits
a victim may receive"); Carriers Ins. Co. v.
Burakowski, 93 Misc.2d 100, 402 N.Y.S.2d
333, 334 (1978) (declining to go against clear
statutory language to deny PIP benefits to
injured employee).
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This interpretation is consistent with that
of a respected insurance law treatise:
A provision of the no-fault law permitting
an offset of benefits received under worker's compensation laws
rather than the
total disqualification of employed persons,
is the customary approach. Thus, while
the PIP insurer has no absolute defense, it
mat/ receive a credit for the compensation
payments which have been received.
8D John A. Appleman, Insurance Law and
Practice ^ 5187, at 574-75 (1981) (footnotes
omitted) (emphasis added).1
[4J Had the legislature intended PIP insurers to have an absolute defense against
injured employees, lawmakers could have
easily added language to the statute indicating this intent Interestingly, in wording the
uninsured and undennsured motorist coverage statute, the legislature did that very
thing by adding this language: "This coverage does not apply to an employee, who is
injured by an uninsured motorist, whose exclusive remedy is provided by Title 35, Chapter 1, Workers' Compensation." § 31A-22305(4)(b)(n) No similar language is included
in the PIP statutes, and we have " 4no power
to rewrite a statute to make it conform to an
intention not expressed.'" In re Criminal
Investigation, 754 P 2d 633, 640 (Utah 1988)
(quoting Mountain States Tel S: Tel Co v
Public Serv Connn'u, 107 Utah 502, 505, 155
P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1945)).
Ill
CONCLUSION
[5, 6] This case is simply an action by an
employee, Neel, against her employer's nofault insurer The State's designated insurer
here is the State itself. The workers' compensation exclusivity provision does not bar
this action No-fault insurers, including selfinsurers, are required to pay PIP benefits to
injured employees to the extent those benefits exceed workers' compensation benefits.
1.

M a m cases cited b\ the paities a i e not persuasive because those iiinsdictions a p p a r e n t k do
not have statutes similar to section 3 I A - 2 2 309(3) that explain how the legislaluie intended
insurers to coordinate no-fault and workers
compensation benefits
Sec en.
(ridlett
\
Btown
M)7 Ark 18^ 820 S W 2d 4S7 4S9
(I 99 I ) (wor ker ^ compensation e\clusivit\ clause
barred claim for uninsured motorist benefits),
CAM his to \ Lnhnan 222 Conn 769 610 A 2d
1257 1260 (1992) (same) Affiliated FM his to

In so holding, we overrule IML Freight
insofar as it is inconsistent with this opinion.
We are keenly aware of the doctrine of stare
decisis and its importance as " 'a cornerstone
of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is
crucial to the predictability of the law and
the fairness of adjudication.' " State v. Menlies, 889 P.2d 393, 399 (1994) (quoting State
v. Thurnian, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah
1993)). However, in the case of IML
Freight, we are " 'clearly convinced that the
rule was originally erroneous
and that
more good than harm will come by departing
from [its] precedent.' " Menzies, 889 P.2d at
399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill.L.Rev. 367,
367 (1957)).
[7] Although the State's self-insurance
program excludes PIP benefits to any person
entitled to workers' compensation benefits,
this exclusion is not in harmony with statutory requirements and is therefore invalid.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call 712 P.2d 231, 233
(Utah 1985) ("An insurer has the right to
contract with an insured as to the risks it will
or will not assume, as long as neither statutory law nor public policy is violated."); see
also Ferro v. Utah Dept of Commerce, 828
P.2d 507, 512 n. 7 (Utah Ct.App.1992) ('if an
agency regulation is not in harmony with [a]
statute, it is invalid.").
We reverse the district court's grant of
summary judgment and remand to the trial
court for further proceedings.
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., STEWART,
Associate C.J., and DURHAM and
RUSSON, JJ., concur.
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§ KtYNUMBEP SYSTEM >

\ Giaiize Mm Casuuln Co 641 S W 2d 49, 51
(K\ Ct App 1982) ( e m p l o y e r s insurer liable for
both workers c o m p e n s a t i o n and basic reparation benefits). Heavens \ Laclede Gas Co. 755
S W 2d 331 333 (Mo Ct App 1988) (self-insured
e m p k n e r required to provide both uninsured
m o t o n s t coveiage and workers compensation to
e m p l o \ e e ) . Fett\ i Libert\ Mut his Co, 392
Pa Super S71. 573 A 2d 610, 612 (1990) (uninsured motorist benefits independent of workers'
compensation)

